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The theme of the 1988 Annual Conference of the
Association of American Law Sch ols - "The Law
School's Opportunity t Shape the Legal Profes i n:
M ne , Morals & S cial Obligati n" - rai e en rm u
issues . I u pect that many law pr fe r might find it
easy t dismiss this theme a a trite and verworked
cliche, but I think that w uld be an unf rtunate mi take. From my present vantage point in the profe ion,
I fear that legal education is falling short in terms f
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any meaningful effort to "shape the legal profession ."
This may explain the choice of the theme for this year.
To put the matter in a better perspective - at lea t
from my vantage point - let me briefly hare with you
an experience that I had recently when I participated in
a symposium on federal courts at the NYU Law School.
The symposium brought together a number of prominent law professors, leading law practitioners, judicial
administrators and members of the federal bench to
discuss the "crisis in volume" in the federal court .
During our discussion of the cau es and effect of thi
problem, there appeared a clear disjunction between
the academic participants and all other conferees:
for example, virtually all of the judges present at the
symposium attempted - in vain - to convince the
academics of the seriousness of the problem of judicial
overload in our ca e dockets. At the end of the two
days, I and many of my colleagu came away with the
feeling that our friends in the law chools did n t really
understand the problems facing the judiciary or, for that matter, those facing other components of
the legal profession.
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This experience has strengthened my impression
that too many members of the law school community
are either indifferent to or hopelessly naive about
the problems of legal practice. I have never really
understood the gulf between legal academics and
practitioners, for we all profess to be equally concerned
about the systems of justice in this country. Today
we are facing major structural problems that threaten
to alter the basic fabric of our legal system. As a
consequence, we can no longer afford a circumstance where the law schools are isolated in a world
of their own.
A recent ABA report, entitled ' . ... In the Spirit of
Public Service:" A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer
Professionalism, says that any recommendations on
professionalism should begin with the law schools,
"not because they represent the profession's greatest
problems but because they constitute our greatest opportunities." I agree. The teaching and research arm of
our profession has a critical role to play in determining
how justice will be done and what our legal system will
look like in the corning decades. Legal educators cannot
afford to remain only "observers" of the changes that
invariably will affect substantive judgments and
results for those who seek
the protection of our legal
system. If the legal profession
is to be reshaped, one would hope that legal educators
will be among the principal architects.
Some may be skeptical about my claim that there are
major structural problems facing the profession today
that will affect substantive judgments in the law. I will
briefly address these matters, and then suggest why
I believe that legal education has such a critical role
to play in helping to shape the profession.
Let me begin by cataloging what I see as some of the
chief structural problems, issues, or concerns facing the
profession today. Some of these are serious problems,
others merely concerns on which we need to reflect.
Collectively, they represent a greater potential for fundamental change in the legal system than any I can
recall during my lifetime.
The first, and perhaps most discussed, is the crushing case overload at all levels of our court systems. I
call this situation "crushing," because the caseload
burden has taken on such dimensions that it seriously
threatens the ability of courts to produce quality work
in a reasonable time - in short, to do justice. It also
causes judges to establish their own personal priorities
in case handling, which in turn may result in some
judges giving back-of-the-hand treatment to disfavored
categories of cases.
During my years in a law school environrne11t- first
as a student and then as a full-time teacher - my natural perspective on appellate cases was to look at how
they had been decided and explained. Now what we face
increasingly in the world of judging is pressure to succumb to the perspective inherent in the advice given

to one of my colleagues at his investiture several years
ago, that in the end "there will be only one question:
.does he keep up with the workload? Are the opinions
out on time?"
The caseload crisis, some of you will respond, is not
new. In one sense, this is true. Even in what now seems
to have been the pre-modern era of the 1950s, Chief Justice Warren was writing about "Delay and Congestion
in the Federal Courts," and Attorneys General Brownell
and Rogers convened a series of Department of Justice
Conferences on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation. This makes it easy for academic critics to argue
that the judges pointing to the caseload explosion are,
once again, "crying wolf." So what is new?
What is new is that we do not know what is causing
the crisis, and we do not know what to do about it. As
Judge Posner has pointed out, earlier caseload expansions tended to have readily identifiable causes. The

Too many members of the law
school community are either indifferent to or
hopelessly naive about the problems of legal
practice.
doubling of the federal district courts' caseload in the
1920s and early 30s was, for example, a consequence of
Prohibition. The caseload dropped dramatically when
Prohibition was repealed. Today, Posner argues, the
causes of caseload growth are "not only complex,
but unclear."
More important, we appear to have run out of viable
solutions to deal with the caseload problem. The obvious answers - such as more judges, specialized
courts, another level of intermediate courts, expansion
of so-called "prudential" doctrines to keep potential
litigants out of court, or even the curtailment of substantive legal remedies - are now widely resisted
as either unacceptable or insufficient.
The academic response to the caseload crisis, as
seemed evident at the NYU symposium, is largely a
denial that such a problem exists. For example, an article appearing in a recent edition of the Michigan Law
Review suggests that the absence of congestion in appellate dockets can be inferred from the fact that certain
circuit judges (myself included) seem to find time for
speeches, legal scholarship and part-time teaching ..
Reacting to a similar comment at the NYU symposium,
my colleague Judge Ruth Ginsburg whispered to me
that the academics seem to want judges to do no more
than issue decisions so that the academics will have a
monopoly on explaining what they mean! More fundamentally, it is naive to assume that courts could keep up
with the press of mounting caseloads even if judges did
21

nothing but work on purely judicial matters night and
day for seven days a week.
Some academic critics have gone to impressive
lengths to document the nonexistence of a "litigation
explosion." However, their debunking of the notion that
we are becoming a more litigious society is not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a caseload
crisis. In any case, the result is, as Thomas Marvell has
recently written in Judicature, "a clearly drawn dispute
between social scientists and the judiciary." Marvell's
research exposes some of the weaknesses in the social
scientists' studies, and confirms the judges' "persistent
claims that caseload growth is a problem."
Related to the judiciary's caseload problem, yet
distinct from it, is the rising expense and length of litigation. I say that this is a distinct problem, because I
have in mind here not so much the delay caused by
judicial backlogs as the length and expense of litigation
inherent in the procedures we use to resolve many of
our disputes. There are some indications, to be sure,
that delays in federal court have not increased significantly over the last several decades. Even if correct,
however, this data is beside
the point. One would
have hoped, first of all, that
the years would have produced answers, rather than
more of the same problem.
More fundamentally, the
consequences of delay are now
very different and much greater than they once were.
The rising caseloads mean that more cases are delayed;
as a consequence, apart from the rising number of disaffected litigants, the practical difficulties involved in
handling the caseload become immense. For example,
the more cases that are heard, the greater the likelihood
of error or confusion in legal doctrines; this, in turn, inevitably results in more intra- and inter-circuit conflicts
in the law. Moreover, delays now are attributable to new
factors, not present in the past, such as abuse of the discovery process. Instead of resolving the problem of
delay, we have adopted litigation techniques which become problems themselves and thus exacerbate the
already-existing problem of delay.
Another factor effecting change within the profession is the extraordinary growth of law firms. It is
hardly necessary for me to remind you of the dimensions of these changes. Just 20 years ago, the largest
law firm in this country had only 169 lawyers, and the
twentieth in size had 106. Today the largest firm has
topped the 1,000 mark, and a firm of 106 lawyers would
no longer even make the top 250. Similarly, salaries
paid to graduating law students in the major firms
have skyrocketed. While ten years ago the going rate
in New York was $27,500, several firms there have recently raised their first-year compensation to $71,000.
What are the consequences of such developments?
It is clear that the high salaries paid in the larger firms
create more and more pressure to generate billable
hours. This in turn must place pressure on these firms
to do business in ways not done before. Some big firms

now offer huge "signing bonuses" to top recruits. Firms
are less hesitant now to "raid" for legal talent and lucrative clients. Reports of management shake-ups and firm
break-ups seem almost commonplace. The rest of the
"industry," in order to compete, comes under pressure
to follow suit. It is my impression, for example, based
on talks with former students and law clerks, as well
as partners of major law firms, and routine reports in
journals like the American Lawyer, that the firms expect
far too much of students coming out of law school which is ironic since graduating law students today are
in my view less well prepared for practice than those
of my generation. What they face in practice often has
little to do with what they learned in law school.
There is another problem associated with the coming
of age of the big law firm. The money offered by these
firms, we now know, is not without consequence for
the career choices of graduating law students. While I
do not subscribe generally to Derek Bok's criticism of,

A
dispmportionate percentage
of the ablest members of a generation are

choosing to devote their entire careers to
serving the legal needs of corporate America.
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the field of law for draining off the best and brightest
minds, his comment is a telling one when we recognize
that a disproportionate percentage of the ablest members
of a generation are choosing to devote their entire careers to serving the legal needs of corporate America.
In this same vein, it is also noteworthy that we are
still struggling with the problem of legal services for the
poor and the middle class. Derek Bok notes that while
the large institutions complain about too much law,
"[i]ndigent defendants are herded through the criminal
courts to receive hastily negotiated prison sentences,
while people of modest means find it hard to afford a
lawyer even for simple legal problems." Many observers
have noted the shrinkage in recent years of the publicinterest bar. We have also seen the dismantling of the
Legal Services Corporation, with the resulting decrease
in legal services available to the poor. How is it possible
to have a fair system of justice without a strong publicinterest bar and without significant governmental involvement in funding legal services for those who
cannot otherwise afford them? And, should not this
be a matter of the greatest concern for legal education?
Another matter for concern is the role of minorities
in the profession. In certain areas of practice - notably
the large, elite law firms - the representation of minority lawyers is meager at best (rivalling even the
level of underrepresentation of minorities on most
law school faculties).
Other troubling issues relate to our public institutions of justice. For example, over the past few years,

the Department of Justice has attracted considerable
public attention and widespread criticism. The Civil
Rights Division's "enforcement" of civil rights laws has
caused some observers to liken it to the "double speak"
ministries of Orwell's 1984. The once universally respected Solicitor General's office has been the subject
of a detailed critique in a recent book and series in The
New Yorker - a criticism captured succinctly by one Supreme Court Justice who said of the Solicitor General's
staff: "They write political speeches and put the word
'brief' on them." On yet a broader scale, over 110 senior
government officials have been accused of unethical
or illegal conduct in recent years; some have been
indicted, and even convicted.
Finally, among the problems that we face are the
subtle, but discernible, effects of increased competition
in the business of law. As a judge, I am forced to deal
with too many frivolous case filings; I observe too
much sloppy advocacy; I witness inexcusable gouging
of clients; and I even receive pleadings that are flatly
dishonest in their assertions. Not too long ago, for example, an attorney arguing before my court cited a
case (including a "holding"
that was favorable to his
client's position) that did not
exist. The attorney had simply made up the case name to
serve his ends! When he was asked for an explanation,
he claimed that the fabricated case was an oversight due
to "the press of business." A few months before this incident, I had graded a law student's seminar paper and
had discovered that over 80% of the paper had been
copied, almost verbatim, directly from three law review
articles. The student's explanation for cheating was "the
press of work" and his need to get a good job. I offer
these anecdotes not as a general indictment of the profession, but only to prompt us to reflect on the connection between what goes on in law school and in
practice.
There is no doubt that the pressure to compete is
causing some lawyers and law students to forget some
of the most sacred responsibilities of our profession. I
sometimes think that we have entered a fantasy world
where "L.A. Law" is the model of success. I find no
solace in the realization that a large percentage of the
practicing bar is composed of honest lawyers who produce high quality work, for even the best intentioned
lawyers can be overwhelmed by a flawed system.
One question that we face is: to whom do we look to
assume responsibility for deterioration in our systems
of justice? Should not the law schools have some major
role to play in dealing with the mess created by too
many cases, too many frivolous filings, client gouging,
intolerable time delays in case processing, low quality
advocacy, underrepresentation of the po01~ and,dishonest practices? If the law schools do not really know (or
even care) what is going on in practice, is it fair to assume that law students are really prepared to serve
justice (as opposed to simply "making a buck") upon
graduation? Indeed, shouldn't we assume that if the
law schools do not deal with these growing issues,

law graduates will not even know the right questions
to ask upon entering practice - they simply will be
captives of the existing system, for better or worse.
If you agree with me that law schools have a vital role
to play in "shaping the legal profession," what grade
do we get on current performance? Professor Kenneth
Pye says that:
[m]ost, but not all, legal educators dream of a law school faculty that teaches at least some of the basic principles of the
legal order, explains the manner in which the legal process
operates, including those factors that preclude the certainty
that the uninitiated might expect from statutes or case law,
provides an understanding of historical antecedents that
underlie the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary institutions, and suggests the areas ripe for reform. Ideally, these
goals would be accomplished by introducing students not
only to the methodology of traditional legal research, but to
social-science methodology, the decision-theory methodology taught in the best public policy programs, and the

I sometimes think that we have

entered a fantasy world where "L.A. Law" is
the model of success.

intensive case-study methodology used by the best business
schools. Simultaneously, the ideal curriculum would develop
skills in research and writing and teach techniques of interviewing, negotiating, counseling, and planning. It would
provide opportunities for perfecting oral and written expression, and introduce students to trial and appellate advocacy
and the use of computers for legal research and case
preparation.

Not surprisingly, Professor Pye concludes that
"legal educators are acutely aware that contemporary
curricula fall far short of realizing these goals."
The ABA Report on professionalism acknowledges
that "the public views lawyers, at best, as being of
uneven character and quality." The ABA Report is implicitly critical of legal education in the areas of ethics
and professionalism, noting that "a law school's impact
on the professional development of its students should
extend beyond simply teaching legal rules. Law schools
should also confront students with hard ethical issues
and give them a perspective on the legal profession where it has been, where it is now and where it is
going." The Report asserts that "law professors can ...
positively influence the values and ethics of students
by example and through creative teaching." Notably,
however, the ABA Report does not suggest high marks
for current performance.
What are the law schools doing about all this? It is
risky to generalize, except to say that there is still much
to be done. In my view, the gap between the academy
and the profession seems to be growing. Law professors seem more and more often content to talk only
to each other - or perhaps to a few colleagues in other
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academic disciplines - rather than deal with the problems facing the profession. Basic research with no
immediate practical application is crucial to the existence of any great academic institution, but not at the
expense of professional concerns. There are certain things
that only the law schools can do adequately, which are not
being done because the law schools are not doing them.
I am not talking about what we call "clinical
education" or how-to-do-it courses. Anyone who understands me to be saying this will have missed the
whole point of this paper. Rather, I am talking about
structural reforms in the legal profession, i.e., the
things that crucially affect our systems of justice. I am
talking about the interests that will be allowed to survive in our legal system. I am referring to who gets
represented, the nature of the representation they receive, the time it takes to resolve legal questions, the
cost of judgment, the quality of decision-making,
and the ethics of advocacy.
It is essential that law students learn not only how to
argue an appeal, for example, but also how to consider
whether to bring one in the first place. They must know
that there are serious decisions- non-technical, but
professional in the deepest
0
sense of the word - to be
made in every such situation.
W
They must know that in making such decisions they not
only serve a client but that they also affect the system
of justice. If students do not know this on leaving law
school, there is nothing to prevent them from succumbing to the pressure of generating billable hours - and
making "professional" decisions accordingly. My
impression is that most law graduates enter practice
without ever having faced such questions in any meaningful way in law school. If this perception is correct,
then it is certain that they will never reflect on such
questions: they will simply not find the time - or the
incentive - to do so once they have begun practice.
Only the law school experience can offer the student
the luxury of time for reflection on ethical problems.
The movement toward what is generally called
Alternative Dispute Resolution (or ''.ADR") is another
matter that cries out for serious attention in legal education. ADR will greatly affect the legal system and the
practice of law as we enter the 21st Century. The reason
why the dispute resolution field has become so critically important is that we are realizing that we must
have options for resolving some disputes without resort
to the traditional forms of adjudication.
The dispute resolution movement offers the law
schools a dual challenge. On one hand, it is indisputable that it portends signific~nt changes in the way
justice is done. The law schools must prepare their students. for a legal system that includes a variety of ways
of resolving disputes. This is the teaching challenge
to the law schools. As Professor Frank Sander wrote
several years ago, it is inconceivable that "one could
properly teach ... a course [like civil procedure]

without, at a minimum, including a major introductory
segment that seeks to put court adjudication into a
broader dispute resolution framework." While there
does exist a small group of law teachers who, with support from groups like the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution, are attempting to include dispute resolution as a significant part of the law school curriculum,
these efforts are at best uneven.
It is true that there are many more so-called "clinical"
courses being offered now than when I was a law student, but too many of these courses remain mostly
cosmetic. My impression is that a number of clinical
offerings seem to be directed toward insulating the traditional "scholar/teachers" from dealing with the issues
of law practice by pushing those concerns off on the
clinical faculty. These courses consume but a small
portion of the budget; very few teachers are actually involved, and particularly few tenure-track professors;
the number of students affected by clinical experiences
at many schools is relatively small; and there is no
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uniformity in course offerings. Most important, such
programs are rarely integrated into the mainstream
of the curriculum.
In addition to improving upon the teaching mission,
the law schools face a second challenge: that of shaping
the directions dispute resolution takes and thus the
ways in which justice will be done and the law will
develop in the next century. Legal scholars have an important role .to play in helping to determine who, in
the future, goes to court and who goes to some other
forum; what kinds of cases will be decided by a judge,
by someone else, or without any involvement of a
"neutral"; which cases will be appealed, and on what
time track; and what kinds of issues will be resolved by
society at all. This is dispute resolution's research and
advocacy challenge to the law schools.
My point is simply that the academic community is
being naive if it sees ADR and related developments as
essentially technical questions not worthy of scholarly
investigation. If the academy leaves dispute resolution.
to the "enthusiasts," it will mean that the law schools
will have given up any role in the making of significant
decisions about the direction in which the law will
develop. I submit that this is a question that the law
schools must be involved in - not only through teaching but also through research, and not merely in a
reactive mode but through active participation. Thus
far, except for a small group of law teachers who are
pioneering efforts to integrate legal education and
·legal practice, the practicing bar and non-lawyers

have had much more to say about dispute resolution
than have 1 gal scholars.
We could do worse, I believe, than look to our colleagues in the medical pr fession for an example. I
recognize that the medical profession has some unique
- ome would say serious- problems of its own .
Nonetheless, medical educators at least understand (and
often seek to address) the problems of their profession,
by dint of their constant exposure to them through the
actual practice of medicine. It is not at all clear that
many law professors, who lack their medical-school
colleagues' advantage of being close to practice, even
realize that there is major research and teaching to
be done in regard to both the profession and the
substance of law.
Wor e still is the attitude of active disdain for law
practice that one continues to find too frequently
among law faculties. While there always has been some
of this, I am now hearing from young friends in academe who are being positively steered away from any
attention to the real world of the profession - even to
thee tent that they feel their tenure may be on the line.
It seems the height of absurdity to do without the services of young scholars who are inclined to devote a
meaningful portion of their careers to bridging the gap
between these two worlds. In view of the mounting
problems facing the profession, we cannot afford the
luxury of allowing law teachers to adopt either the posture of pure reflection, which ignores the profession,
or that of active disdain for it.
Nor can we afford the situation described by Ken
Pye, where "legal educators appear to be [stuck] at a
point midway between introspection and self-flagellation." Legal education has much to offer the
profession in the way of possible solutions to existing
problems. The problems that we now face are so manifold that we can no longer tolerate any further growth
in the disjunction between the study and practice of
law. We need the law ch ol to help shape the legal
profes ion as we engage this profound era of change.
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